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UNITED STATES V. COMSTOCK:
THE NEXT CHAPTER
IN THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN
STATE AND CONGRESSIONAL POWER
Lauren Kulpa*
I. INTRODUCTION
Few issues concern parents, members of Congress, and the
courts more than the welfare of children. When it comes to
protecting our children, everything seems so necessary that it all
becomes proper. Last year, the U.S. Supreme Court held that under
the Necessary and Proper Clause1 the Constitution empowers
Congress to enact statutes authorizing court-ordered civil
commitment of sexually dangerous, mentally ill federal prisoners.2
The statute at issue arose out of a federal statutory regime aimed at
protecting children from child pornography and sexual abuse. While
the case holding may seem narrow, the flexibility of the Court’s
novel five-factored test may result in increased federal intrusion into
state sovereignty and jeopardize civil liberties.

* J.D., Loyola Law School Los Angeles, 2011; B.A., Texas A&M University, 2008. First,
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1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (“The Congress shall have Power To . . . make all laws
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all
other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any
Department or Officer thereof.”).
2. United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1954 (2010).
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II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In 2006, Congress enacted the Adam Walsh Child Protection
and Safety Act to protect children from sexual molestation, abuse,
and child pornography, and to promote Internet safety.3 In relevant
part, at 18 U.S.C. § 4248 (“Section 4248”) the act provides for the
“[c]ivil commitment of a sexually dangerous person.” This statute
allows the Attorney General to seek from federal courts a
certification that a person in federal custody is sexually dangerous.4
For purposes of Section 4248, a person is sexually dangerous if the
individual (1) “has engaged or attempted to engage in sexually
violent conduct or child molestation”; (2) “suffers from a serious
mental illness, abnormality, or disorder”; and (3) “as a result of [the
mental illness] would have serious difficulty in refraining from
sexually violent conduct or child molestation if released.”5 If the
court finds the above criteria by clear and convincing evidence, then
the court will commit the person to the Attorney General’s custody.6
Upon certification, the Attorney General must make reasonable
efforts to release the person to either the state in which the person
was domiciled or the state in which the person was tried.7 If neither
state will assume responsibility for the person’s custody, care, and
treatment, then the Attorney General must place the person in a
suitable facility until either a state will take responsibility for the
person or the person is no longer sexually dangerous.8
United States v. Comstock9 involved the government’s attempt
to civilly commit five offenders as sexually dangerous pursuant to
Section 4248. Three of the offenders—Graydon Comstock, Thomas
Matherly, and Markis Revland—had all pled guilty to possession of
child pornography;10 a fourth offender, Marvin Virgil, had pled guilty

3. Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109–248, 120 Stat.
587 (2006).
4. 18 U.S.C. § 4248(a) (2006).
5. 18 U.S.C. §§ 4247(a)(5)–(6) (2006).
6. 18 U.S.C. § 4248(d).
7. Id.
8. Id. A person may be deemed no longer sexually dangerous if the person’s condition has
improved or the condition is controlled by psychiatric, medical, or psychological treatment. Id.
9. 130 S. Ct. 1949 (2010).
10. United States v. Comstock, 507 F. Supp. 2d 522, 526 & n.2 (E.D.N.C. 2007), aff’d, 551
F.3d 274 (4th Cir. 2009), rev’d, 130 S. Ct. 1949 (2010).
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to sexual abuse of a minor.11 In each case, the offenders were on the
verge of release from federal prison when the government sought
certification under Section 4248.12 The fifth offender, Shane Catron,
had been charged with aggravated sexual abuse of a minor and
abusive sexual conduct but was found incompetent to stand trial.13
The government sought to certify Catron under Section 4248 around
the same time as the other four offenders.14 The offenders brought
suit against the government claiming, among other things, that
Section 4248 exceeded Congress’s constitutional authority.15
The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of North
Carolina held that the statute was unconstitutional because it was not
necessary and proper to carry out any enumerated power, such as
Congress’s power to prosecute,16 to regulate pursuant to the
Commerce Clause,17 or to prevent criminal conduct.18 In addition, the
district court found that Section 4248 “impermissibly intrude[d] upon
an area historically regulated by the states.”19 The Fourth Circuit
affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that the Necessary and
Proper Clause did not authorize Congress to enact this statute due to
the absence of a sufficient link between certification as “sexual
dangerousness” and a federal crime.20 The U.S. Supreme Court
granted certiorari in June 2009 to settle a circuit split.21
11. Id.
12. United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1955 (2010).
13. Comstock, 507 F. Supp. 2d at 526.
14. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1955.
15. Comstock, 507 F. Supp. 2d at 526.
16. Id. at 534 (concluding “that civil commitment of sexually dangerous persons whose
prison sentences are about to expire is not a necessary and proper extension of Congress's power
to prosecute federal crimes”).
17. Id. at 534–36 (rejecting the government’s argument as an attempt to regulate
noneconomic activity).
18. Id. at 536–40 (rejecting the government’s argument because the statute does not account
for an offender’s likelihood to commit a federal sex crime as opposed to a state sex crime).
19. Id. at 551. The district court also addressed whether the statute constituted a criminal
rather than civil proceeding (ultimately finding Section 4248 to be a civil scheme), id. at 529–30,
and whether the statute’s clear and convincing standard violated due process (finding that due
process requires a “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard). Id. at 551–59. The Supreme Court did
not address these issues. See Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1956.
20. United States v. Comstock, 551 F.3d 274, 282, 284–85 (4th Cir. 2009), rev’d, 130 S. Ct.
1949.
21. United States v. Comstock, 129 S. Ct. 2828 (2009). The Eighth Circuit held that Section
4248 was within Congress’s constitutional authority under both the Commerce and Necessary and
Proper Clauses. United States v. Tom, 565 F.3d 497, 502–03 (8th Cir. 2009). The First Circuit
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III. REASONING OF THE COURT
A. Majority Opinion
Justice Breyer delivered the Court’s opinion, which was joined
by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and
Stevens.22 The Court only addressed whether Congress had authority
under the Necessary and Proper Clause23 to enact the statute at issue;
it did not decide whether other constitutional violations, such as due
process or equal protection violations, existed.24 Using an
unprecedented analysis, the majority upheld Section 4248, finding
that Congress had the constitutional power to enact the statute.25 In
coming to this conclusion, the Court relied on five considerations:
(1) the breadth of the Necessary and Proper Clause, (2) the
long history of federal involvement in this arena, (3) the
sound reasons for the statute’s enactment in light of the
government’s custodial interest in safeguarding the public
from dangers posed by those in federal custody, (4) the
statute’s accommodation of state interests, and (5) the
statute’s narrow scope.26
The reasoning behind each factor is described below.
1. Breadth of the Necessary and Proper Clause
First, the Court set up a deferential backdrop for its analysis.27
The Court found that the Necessary and Proper Clause gives
Congress “broad authority to enact federal legislation.”28 Citing
McCulloch v. Maryland,29 Justice Breyer noted that while the
government is given limited enumerated powers, it must have “ample
held that the statute was within Congress’s constitutional authority under the Necessary and
Proper Clause and did not infringe on the states’ powers. United States v. Volungus, 595 F.3d 1,
10 (1st Cir. 2010).
22. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1953. For a poetic recap of the government’s and respondents’
arguments, see Court Commentary: U.S. v. Comstock . . . In Verse (Feb. 28, 2010),
http://culturefuture.blogspot.com/2010/02/court-commentary-united-states-v.html.
23. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 18.
24. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1956.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 1965.
27. See id. at 1956–58.
28. Id. at 1956.
29. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
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means for [the] execution” of those powers.30 Additionally,
“necessary” does not mean absolutely necessary.31 To determine
whether a statute falls within the Necessary and Proper Clause,
courts must “look to see whether the statute constitutes a means that
is rationally related to the implementation of a constitutionally
enumerated power.”32 This test presumes that Congress’s choice of
means is constitutional, leaving much to Congress’s discretion.33
Justice Breyer then looked to several areas as examples when
Congress had passed legislation purportedly in furtherance of its
enumerated powers, despite the Constitution not specifically
enumerating the power for such legislation.34 To start, Justice Breyer
noted that Congress has the power under the Necessary and Proper
Clause to further its enumerated powers by creating a wide range of
federal crimes, even though the Constitution only explicitly grants
Congress the power to criminalize acts relating to “counterfeiting,”
“treason,” and “Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas” or
“against the Law of Nations.”35 The Necessary and Proper Clause
also allows Congress to enforce federal crimes by building prison
facilities and sentencing offenders to federal prisons.36 Congress’s
power extends even further to regulate the federal prisons by
enacting laws that “ensure the safety of the prisoners, prison workers
and visitors, and those in the surrounding communities . . . .”37 In
other words, the Constitution does not explicitly give Congress the
power to criminalize conduct, imprison offenders, or enact laws
governing prisons and prisoners; however, the Necessary and Proper
Clause grants Congress these powers because they are rational means
to implement constitutionally enumerated powers.38

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1956 (citing McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 408).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1957.
Id. at 1957–58.
Id. at 1957 (referring to U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 6, 10).
Id. at 1958.
Id.
Id.
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2. History of Federal Involvement
Next, Justice Breyer determined that the federal government had
a history of involvement in prison-related mental-health regulation
and that Section 4248 was only a “modest addition” to this statutory
scheme.39 While the government’s history of involvement is not
determinative of a statute’s constitutionality, it is “helpful in
reviewing the substance of a congressional statutory scheme” and in
determining whether the statute is reasonably related to the preexisting federal interests.40 Justice Breyer traced congressional
involvement back to the mid-to-late 1800s, which evolved from
establishing a hospital to treat the Army and Navy’s insane
population to creating a civil-commitment scheme for persons who
had become insane while in federal custody.41
Starting in the late 1940s, Congress made a series of reforms to
its civil-commitment legislation in response to concerns regarding
the release of dangerous and insane prisoners.42 These reforms
eventually led to the creation of the civil-commitment statute used
today, the Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984.43 Section 4246 of
the Insanity Defense Reform Act authorizes civil commitment if the
prisoner’s “release would create a substantial risk of bodily injury to
another person or serious damage to the property of another.”44
Justice Breyer found that Section 4248 only differed from Section
4246 in that it targets persons who are “sexually dangerous” due to
mental illness.45
3. Government’s Custodial Interest
Third, Justice Breyer concluded that the federal government’s
extension of its civil-commitment system to cover mentally ill and
sexually dangerous prisoners was reasonable, even if it effectively
extended the prisoners’ sentences.46 Justice Breyer rooted his
39. Id. at 1961.
40. Id. at 1958 (quoting Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 21 (2005)).
41. Id. at 1958–59.
42. Id. at 1959–61.
43. Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. §§ 4241–4247 (2006); Comstock, 130
S. Ct. at 1960.
44. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1960 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 4246(d)).
45. Id. at 1961.
46. Id.
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reasonableness analysis in the federal government’s role as the
custodian of its prisoners.47 He described this unenumerated role as
one that gives the federal government the constitutional power to act
to protect communities from dangers that federal prisoners may
impose.48 Thus, he found Section 4248 “‘reasonably adapted’ to
Congress’ power to act as a responsible federal custodian” because it
was reasonable for Congress to conclude that mentally ill and
sexually dangerous federal inmates might pose a great threat to the
public if released.49
4. Statute’s Accommodation of State Interests
Fourth, Justice Breyer concluded that Section 4248 does not
violate the states’ interests.50 He rejected the respondents’ claim that
Section 4248 violates the Tenth Amendment by allowing the federal
government to regulate an area typically left to state control.51 Justice
Breyer reasoned that powers delegated to the federal government
include both constitutionally enumerated powers and the authority
under the Necessary and Proper Clause to implement those powers.52
Therefore, because the Tenth Amendment reserves only powers not
delegated to the United States as powers for the states, the power to
regulate federal prisoners cannot be considered a power reserved to
the states.53
Justice Breyer also noted that Section 4248 does not invade state
sovereignty or limit states’ powers.54 Instead, by requiring the
Attorney General to encourage states to take responsibility for
offenders, the statute accommodates the states’ interests.55 If a state
asserts authority over a prisoner, then the federal government must
immediately transfer that prisoner into state custody.56 In addition,
Justice Breyer concluded that Section 4248 better protects states’

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id. at 1961–62.
Id.
Id. at 1961 (internal citation omitted).
Id. at 1962–63.
Id. at 1962.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 4248(d) (2006)).
Id.
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interests than its 1949 predecessor statute, which the Court had
previously upheld.57
5. Statute’s Narrow Scope
Finally, Justice Breyer found that Section 4248’s connection to
an enumerated power was neither “too attenuated” nor “too sweeping
in its scope.”58 He rejected the contention that “Congress’ authority
can be no more than one step removed from a specifically
enumerated power.”59 He found support in the Court’s precedent,
which has held that from Congress’s implied power to punish flows
its implied power to imprison and to civilly commit mentally ill
prisoners.60 Justice Breyer also provided examples in which the Court
had applied this “implied power flowing from an implied power”
analysis in upholding statutes enacted to execute enumerated powers
under the Spending Clause.61
Justice Breyer also reasoned that the statute’s limited application
of congressional power did not threaten state sovereignty. He
rejected claims that upholding the statute would give Congress a
general police power, which is generally reserved for the states.62
Because the statute’s reach is limited to a small fraction of prisoners
and to those already in federal custody, he gave no credence to the
concern that the federal government was usurping power from the
states.63
B. Concurrences
While Justice Kennedy agreed with the majority holding, his
concurrence expressed concern that the majority did not fully
account for possible federalism violations.64 First, Justice Kennedy
(and Justice Alito)65 was concerned that the majority’s analysis
57. Id. at 1963 (referring to Greenwood v. United States, 350 U.S. 366 (1956)).
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 1964.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 1964–65.
64. See id. at 1965–68 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
65. Id. at 1968–70 (Alito, J., concurring) (finding that the statute can be upheld under the
more traditional Necessary and Proper analysis because it is necessary and proper to “carrying
into execution the enumerated powers that support the federal criminal statutes under which the
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misapplied rational basis review. He distinguished between the
highly deferential rational basis test used in the context of due
process challenges and the more exacting rational basis required in
Commerce Clause cases.66 He warned against blending the two
standards, fearing that the majority’s discussion of rational basis in
analyzing claims under the Necessary and Proper Clause could
improperly be read as requiring a “mere conceivable rational
relation,” as is typically used for due process rational basis, instead
of requiring a “tangible link” to the enumerated power.67
Second, Justice Kennedy cautioned against Congress usurping
states’ powers.68 He warned that analyzing Congress’s power under
the Necessary and Proper Clause must go one step further—to
address whether the power compromises “essential attributes of state
sovereignty.”69 Merely deciding first that the power falls under the
Necessary and Proper Clause without then determining whether
federalist concerns improperly limit the power broadens the scope of
congressional power.70
C. Thomas’s Dissent
Justice Thomas, joined for the most part by Justice Scalia,
dissented from the majority opinion because the majority failed to
show that Section 4248 executed an enumerated power.71 Justice
Thomas emphasized that “[t]he Constitution plainly sets forth the
‘few and defined’ powers that Congress may exercise” and that the
Necessary and Proper Clause is used to carry out these “few and
defined powers.”72 Justice Thomas criticized the majority for failing
to name the enumerated power that Section 4248 seeks to carry out.73
He argued that the statute does not even come within the broadly
construed Commerce Clause’s purview because precedent states that
Congress may not regulate noneconomic activity based only on its
affected prisoners were convicted,” and thus “protect the public from dangers created by the
federal criminal justice and prison systems”).
66. Id. at 1966–67 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
67. Id. at 1967.
68. Id. at 1966.
69. Id. at 1967–68.
70. See id.
71. Id. at 1970 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
72. Id. at 1971 (quotations omitted).
73. Id. at 1973.
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effect on interstate commerce.74 Instead, he viewed Section 4248 as
similar to the involuntary civil-commitment laws that states enact
under their general police powers.75
Justice Thomas also questioned the majority’s use of a fivefactor test instead of McCulloch’s framework to determine Section
4248’s constitutionality.76 Referring to the test as “novel,” Justice
Thomas commented that the test raises more questions than it
answers because the majority never specified whether all factors are
needed, which factors are most important if only some are needed,
and so forth.77 He then raised counterarguments as to the majority’s
analysis of each factor.78
VI. ANALYSIS
A. Majority’s Departure from a Formulaic Analysis
Despite predictions that the Court would find Section 4248
unconstitutional,79 the majority held that the Necessary and Proper
Clause gives Congress the power to enact this statute. The majority’s
unprecedented five-factored analysis was necessary to uphold the
civil commitment of dangerous sexual offenders because the statute
could not withstand a more traditional analysis under the Necessary
and Proper Clause.
1. Section 4248 Likely Cannot Withstand the
Traditional Means-Ends Analysis
In discussing factor one (the breadth of the Necessary and
Proper Clause), Justice Breyer correctly explained that “necessary”
under the Necessary and Proper Clause has not been interpreted to

74. Id.
75. Id. at 1974.
76. See id. at 1974–75.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1975–83.
79. See, e.g., Robin Morse, Note, Federalism Challenges to the Adam Walsh Act, 89 B.U. L.
REV. 1753, 1754–55 (2009). Additionally, some scholars argue that the expansion of federal
crimes violates federalism. See, e.g., Susan A. Ehrlich, The Increasing Federalization of Crime,
32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 825, 837–39 (2000). See generally Wayne A. Logan, Criminal Justice
Federalism and National Sex Offender Policy, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 51, 53–59 (2008) (tracking
the historical expansion of federal crimes).
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mean “absolutely necessary.”80 He then developed the “means-ends”
test to determine whether Congress’s actions fall within the
Necessary and Proper Clause’s scope:81 “whether the statute
constitutes a means that is rationally related to the implementation of
a constitutionally enumerated power.”82 Put another way, the inquiry
asks “whether the means chosen are ‘reasonably adapted’ to the
attainment of a legitimate end” under Congress’s constitutional
powers.83 However, as Justice Thomas commented, Justice Breyer
ignored this framework and instead listed five factors that led him to
conclude that Section 4248 is constitutional.84
Under a more traditional means-ends analysis, the Court could
not uphold Section 4248 because the statute does not rationally relate
to furthering an enumerated power. The majority correctly pointed
out that Congress has the power to enact criminal laws that are
necessary and proper to carrying out their enumerated powers.85
Chief Justice John Marshall described the classic example in
McCulloch.86 From Congress’s enumerated power to establish post
offices and post roads, it “has been inferred the power and duty of
carrying the mail along the post road, from one post office to
another. And, from this implied power, has again been inferred the
right to punish those who steal letters from the post office, or rob the
mail.”87 These inferred-from-inferred powers are all rationally related
to Congress’s enumerated power to establish a national post office
system. Here, however, unlike in McCulloch, Congress did not seek
to punish those who had impeded its enumerated rights. Instead,
Congress went one step further to prevent crimes—whether or not
those crimes involve violations of federal or state law.
The Adam Walsh Act set out “[t]o protect children from sexual
exploitation and violent crime, to prevent child abuse and child
80. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1956 (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,
413–15 (1819)).
81. Id. at 1956–57.
82. Id. at 1956 (emphasis added).
83. Id. at 1957 (quoting Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 37 (2005)).
84. See id. at 1974 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“The Court perfunctorily genuflects to
McCulloch’s framework for assessing Congress’ Necessary and Proper Clause authority, . . . then
promptly abandons both in favor of a novel five-factor test . . . .”).
85. See id. at 1957–58 (majority opinion).
86. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 417 (1819).
87. See id.
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pornography, to promote Internet safety, and to honor the memory of
Adam Walsh and other child crime victims.”88 The act was likely
enacted pursuant to the Commerce Clause, as this clause has been
interpreted to give Congress expansive powers.89 The act
criminalizes child pornography, kidnapping, and child prostitution.90
Congress’s “legitimate end” under the Commerce Clause could be to
punish those who violate Congress’s statutory mandate that child
prostitution and pornography be kept out of the stream of commerce.
Thus, Section 4248 must be a means that is “rationally related” to
implementing the federal sex-crimes regulations.91
Past cases upholding congressional action under the Necessary
and Proper Clause have had a closer link between the action and the
enumerated power than Section 4248 does with the Commerce
Clause. For example, in Greenwood v. United States92 (discussed in
briefs for both parties), the Court upheld a civil-commitment statute
for those mentally incompetent to stand trial for federal crimes.93 In
Greenwood, the offender was awaiting trial in federal court for
robbing a post office.94 The Court, in upholding the statute, explained
that the “[t]he power to put [the offender] into such custody—the
power to prosecute for federal offenses—[was] not exhausted.”95 The
government’s power to commit the offender was a rationally related
means to carrying out its power to establish post offices; the
government must be able to prosecute crimes against post offices to
ensure that the post offices are efficiently run.
The majority failed to distinguish Greenwood from the case at
hand.96 Section 4248, unlike the statute in Greenwood, does not
enable the government to punish and imprison offenders for federal
sex crimes because the offenders have already been sentenced. In
88. Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109–248, 120 Stat.
587.
89. See Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1973 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (describing the Commerce
Clause as “the enumerated power [the Supreme Court] has interpreted most expansively”); see,
e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (holding that Congress’s ban of home-grown
marijuana may be upheld under the Commerce Clause).
90. Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act, 120 Stat. at 587–89.
91. See Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1956.
92. 350 U.S. 366 (1956).
93. Id. at 375.
94. Id. at 369.
95. Id. at 375.
96. See Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1963.
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fact, four of the five offenders in this case were within months of
being released when the government sought civil-commitment
certification under Section 4248.97 In essence, the government’s
power to prosecute federal crimes had already been exhausted.
The majority’s and government’s insistence that Section 4248 is
linked to the government’s custodial power is similarly
unconvincing.98 It is undisputed that Congress holds the power to
house federal prisoners and apprehend escaped prisoners pursuant to
the Necessary and Proper Clause.99 For instance, extending the
McCulloch example, the government’s implied power to punish
those who steal from the post office would be meaningless unless the
government could establish a facility to house offenders being
punished. In addition, the government has the implied power to
apprehend escaped prisoners; it would be meaningless to have the
power to punish offenders for federal crimes yet lack the power to
ensure that the offenders serve their sentences in their entirety. In this
example, both the implied power to build prisons and the implied
power to apprehend escaped prisoners rationally relate to the
government’s enumerated power to establish post offices.
Section 4248, however, does not flow from an implied power to
build prisons and apprehend federal prisoners. The statute does not
ensure that an offender serves his full sentence as punishment for a
federal crime pursuant to Congress furthering an enumerated
power.100 Instead, Section 4248 is a preventive measure—a person in
federal custody may be civilly committed to prevent the person from
engaging in sexually violent conduct or child molestation upon
release.101 The preventive nature of Section 4248, unlike those of the
statutes at issue in McCulloch and Greenwood, does not further
Congress’s enforcement of an enumerated power. Furthermore, the

97. Id. at 1955.
98. See id. at 1961–62; Reply Brief for the United States at 14–17, Comstock, 130 S. Ct.
1949 (No. 08-1224), 2009 WL 4247966, at *14–17.
99. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1970 (Alito, J., concurring).
100. See Ilya Somin, Taking Stock of Comstock: The Necessary and Proper Clause and the
Limits of Federal Power, 2009–2010 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 239, 249–51 (discussing the
disconnect between Section 4248 and Congress’s authority that flows from its enumerated
powers).
101. See 18 U.S.C. § 4248(a) (2006) (stating that the Attorney General may certify that the
person is sexually dangerous and that he or she may not be discharged until found to no longer be
sexually dangerous to others).
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civil-commitment statute considers all sex crimes. While an
argument could be made that the commitment regime may be
necessary and proper to carrying out the prevention of federal sex
crimes such as child pornography, the civil-commitment statute does
not limit itself to the prevention of purely federal crimes.102 A
propensity toward any sexual violence (whether constituting a
federal or state crime) will count in the certification proceedings.103
Because Section 4248 is not a means rationally related to
furthering any enumerated power, it is beyond Congress’s
constitutional power. Section 4248 does not allow for the
prosecution, or even prevention, of federal crimes. The conduct has
already been punished and the statute instead seeks to prevent
conduct that exceeds the bounds of Congress’s authority under the
Commerce Clause. Thus, Section 4248 could not be upheld under the
traditional means-ends analysis.
2. Strategic Move to Five-Factored Test
Given that Section 4248 could not withstand the traditional
means-ends analysis, the majority’s decision to uphold the statute
under a five-factored test seems deliberate. Some commentators
regard Comstock as an indication of the Court’s response to
inevitable issues regarding the constitutionality of the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act.104 Issues like this may fare better
under the majority’s analysis as opposed to the traditional means-

102. Justice Alito argues that there is an “attenuated link” between congressional powers to
enact criminal statutes and Section 4248 because Congress must protect the public from
dangerous federal prisoners under a traditional Necessary and Proper Clause analysis. Comstock,
130 S. Ct. at 1970 (Alito, J., concurring). However, he fails to address that Congress is exceeding
its power by not limiting the statute’s application to federal crimes.
103. See 18 U.S.C. § 4247(a)(5) (defining “sexually dangerous person” as “a person who has
engaged or attempted to engage in sexually violent conduct or child molestation and who is
sexually dangerous to others”).
104. See Marcia Coyle, Health Care Reform Spurs Litigation Talk, 32 NAT’L L.J. 25, (2009);
David G. Savage, Justices Widen Federal Scope, BALT. SUN, May 18, 2010, at 1A; Michael C.
Dorf, The Supreme Court’s Decision About Sexually Dangerous Federal Prisoners: Could It
Hold the Key to the Constitutionality of the Individual Mandate to Buy Health Insurance?,
FINDLAW.COM (May 19, 2010), http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dorf/20100519.html. Still others
suggest that the majority wanted to uphold the statute because it dealt with sexual deviants, an
unpopular social group. See, e.g., Ruthann Robson, Necessary and Proper to Extend Civil
Commitment for Sex Offenders CONST. L. PROF BLOG (May 17, 2010),
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/conlaw/2010/05/necessary-and-proper-to-extend-civilcommittment-for-sex-offenders-comstock-opinion-analysis.html.
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ends analysis because the majority’s five-factored analysis could be
read to give Congress even more sweeping powers.105
First, the five-factored analysis tips the scales in favor of the
constitutionality of Congress’s actions from the start. The first
factor’s assertion that “the Necessary and Proper Clause grants
Congress broad authority to enact federal legislation” sets the tone
for this deferential analysis.106 In describing this factor, Justice
Breyer makes clear that courts should defer to Congress’s
judgment.107 Rather than a factor, this seems to state a presumption in
favor of upholding congressional action, like the deferential rational
basis review used in substantive due process claims.108
Second, the majority favors constitutionality through its
willingness to allow implied powers to count as legitimate ends. This
allows Justice Breyer to conclude that the link between Section 4248
and a legitimate end are “not too attenuated.”109 In deciding this,
Justice Breyer echoed those powers set out by the government110 to
find that Congress has an implied power to punish and imprison, and
a further implied power to enact civil-commitment laws. As
discussed above, had the majority followed a more traditional meansends analysis, in which legitimate ends are limited to those
enumerated powers in the Constitution, then Section 4248 could not
pass constitutional muster.111 By allowing an analysis to rest on
implied powers rather than enumerated powers, the Court allows
Congress to claim broader powers and imposes a less stringent
connection between the means and the ends.
Finally, the majority’s use of factors allows for flexibility in the
analysis, which could favor finding Congress’s actions
constitutional. Justice Thomas’s dissent raises an important question
105. But see Somin, supra note 100, at 262–64 (explaining how the Comstock majority
opinion might actually be detrimental to the individual mandate of the Obama administration’s
health care plan in court).
106. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1956.
107. See id. at 1957.
108. See id. at 1966–67 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
109. Id. at 1963 (majority opinion).
110. Brief for the United States at 21–39, Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949 (No. 08-1224), 2009 WL
2896312, at *21–39 (describing “Congress’s unquestioned power to enact criminal laws
prohibiting conduct within the scope of its Article I powers, to operate a federal penal system for
the punishment of offenses under those laws, and to place persons convicted of or pending trial
for violating those laws in federal custody”).
111. See supra Part IV.A.1.
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regarding the “novel” five-factored analysis, pointing out the lack of
clarity under the majority’s holding as to whether all five factors are
necessary to uphold a statute under the Necessary and Proper
Clause.112 Even Justice Alito’s concurrence expresses concern over
the ambiguity of the majority’s standard.113 Because of this, lower
courts may be able to uphold a statute that satisfies a few, rather than
all, of the outlined factors.
B. Restoring Balance
In his concurrence, Justice Kennedy writes to “caution that the
Constitution does require the invalidation of congressional attempts
to extend federal powers in some instances.”114 His concern regarding
the implications of the majority’s analysis is not unfounded. As
discussed above, the analysis has the potential to broaden Congress’s
power past its constitutional limits. However, there are ways that
courts can limit the majority opinion’s potentially sweeping effects.
First, courts can take note of Justice’s Kennedy’s distinction
between the deferential substantive due process rational basis
analysis and the more exacting rational basis analysis used under the
Commerce Clause. This will allow the first factor to become less of a
presumption in favor of congressional action and allow for more
scrutiny by the courts.
Second, courts should employ a more robust federalism analysis
under the fourth factor. The fourth factor analyzes whether a statute
properly accounts for states’ interests.115 However, Justice Kennedy’s
concurrence expresses concern that the majority’s opinion sets a
precedent that does not properly protect states’ interests.116 Under the
majority’s analysis, it seems that Congress can circumvent
federalism concerns by giving states the option to step in (like
Section 4248, which allows states to take responsibility for the
offender).117 Justice Kennedy warns “[i]t is of fundamental
importance to consider whether essential attributes of state
sovereignty are compromised by the assertion of federal power under
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

See Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1974–75 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1968 (Alito, J., concurring).
Id. at 1966 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id. at 1962 (majority opinion).
Id. at 1967–68 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id. at 1962–63 (majority opinion).

Spring 2011]

UNITED STATES V. COMSTOCK

1161

the Necessary and Proper Clause; if so, that is a factor suggesting
that the power is not one properly within the reach of federal
power.”118 Thus, courts should take federalism concerns more
seriously and be wary of allowing the “inference upon inference”
analysis to turn into a general police power.119
Third, courts should use the majority’s fifth factor to limit
Comstock’s potentially broad implications. Both the majority’s
discussion of the fifth factor120 and Justice Kennedy’s concurrence121
note that the statute is narrow as it only applies to sexually dangerous
federal prisoners. While a statute’s narrow scope does not justify
Congress acting outside the scope of its constitutional powers, this
factor can be used by courts to limit its application to federal crimes
that society finds particularly reprehensible, such as sex crimes
against children.122 Even though states have their own sex-offender
laws, Congress’s federalization of certain sex crimes attempts to
create a national strategy to combat these crimes, allowing for
communication among states to prosecute and prevent these
crimes.123
Regardless, courts must be wary of this type of analysis because
it could be used to justify detaining those convicted of other
deplorable crimes beyond their sentences.124 As one author noted,
many suspected terrorists are not charged under the terrorism statute
but instead are charged with immigration or weapons violations,
which result in lesser penalties.125 By using Section 4248 as a model,
Congress could pass a statute that allows the civil commitment of
118. Id. at 1967–68 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
119. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995).
120. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1964 (describing Section 4248 as “narrow in scope” and
applying “to a small fraction of federal prisoners”).
121. Id. at 1968 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (describing Section 4248 as a “discrete and narrow
exercise of authority over a small class of persons already subject to federal power”).
122. See Logan, supra note 79, at 60–61 (discussing the wave of societal concern regarding
the sexual victimization of children).
123. See Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109–248, 120
Stat. 587 (establishing the National Sex Offender Registry).
124. See Collin P. Wedel, War Courts: Terror’s Distorting Effects on Federal Courts, 3
LEGIS. & POL’Y BRIEF 7, 23–26 (2011) (explaining how the Court’s ruling in Comstock sets a
disturbing precedent for terrorist-detainees); see also Predators and the Constitution, WALL ST.
J., Jan. 19, 2010, at A24 (“In other countries, loose detention laws give wide latitude to
authorities to lock up any number of people who ‘threaten the public safety,’ including political
prisoners.”).
125. Wedel, supra note 124, at 24–25.
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dangerous terrorists, who may have serious difficulty in refraining
from violent or terrorist conduct if released, thus allowing the
government to increase incarceration penalties without charging and
convicting the person of a new crime.126 Similarly, Congress could
pass a Comstock-like prevention statute targeting violent drug
addicts; under such a statute, the government would have the
authority to civilly commit federally incarcerated prisoners who have
committed violent crimes while under the influence of drugs, have
serious drug addictions, and would have serious difficulty in
refraining from drug use if released.
VI. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the majority’s employment of a five-factored
analysis, as opposed to the traditional means-ends analysis, was
pivotal in upholding Section 4248, allowing for the civil commitment
of sexually dangerous federal offenders. Whether the Court’s
analysis was a strategic decision to allow the federal government to
combat sex crimes, especially those against children, or to increase
the likelihood that constitutional issues will be resolved in favor of
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, the majority’s
approach does tip the scales in favor of the constitutionality of
Congress’s actions. In the future, courts will need to employ a more
rigorous federalism analysis to ensure that states’ interests are not
overlooked and to limit the federal government’s powers to those
actually given to them by the Constitution.

126. Id. at 25–26 (suggesting that Congress could “tweak the Comstock statute to allow
indefinite detention based on a finding that a prisoner (1) previously ‘engaged or attempted to
engage in [terrorism-related] violent conduct,’ (2) remains committed to his terrorist cause, and
(3) as a result of his terrorism connections, remains ‘dangerous to others’ such that ‘he would
have serious difficulty in refraining from [terrorist or] violent conduct if released’”).

